Abstract: In this paper we propose a fault tolerant control method which is capable of mitigating steering and drive-train system failures. By utilizing the steering system and the drive-train system complementarily, the proposed method will not need an additional redundancy for the fault tolerant purpose. For the steering system failure which should be detected and managed rapidly, the proposed method utilizes the disturbance observer idea to eliminate the fault detection. On the other hand, for the drive-train system failure, a fault detection is equipped. The effectiveness of this method has been verified in simulation.
INTRODUCTION
The relatively recent development of an electronics technology has given impetus to create a next-generation vehicle. X-by-wire, in particular, has been attracting attention as a technology to dramatically change a today's vehicle. As represented by fly-by-wire for airplanes, X-by-wire is the technology which interprets a driver's intent via sensors and generates electrical commands for actuators. Due to communication by electrical signal, a mechanical linkage is not required. Elimination of the mechanical linkage has brought many significant benefits, such as improvement in fuel consumption, pre-crash safety, crash safety, vehicle architectural flexibility, and so on. Therefore, a replacement of all mechanisms of a vehicle by X-by-wire, such as steer-by-wire, shift-by-wire, and brake-by-wire, has been attempted.
On the other hand, there are many issues with safety if a failure occurs. The difficulty of securing safety prevents Xby-wire products from being popularized. A conventional system, which has secured safety by two or more sensors, microprocessors, and actuators, is very expensive and increases a vehicle's weight, so vehicles equipped with Xby-wire are limited to luxury types. The most important issue of designing X-by-wire products is to secure safety at a suitable cost.
In order to solve these issues, a lot of researchers have already investigated a fault tolerant method of X-by-wire. There are also several significant challenges associated with the fault tolerant of steer-by-wire and drive-by-wire. For instance, combining a steering wheel with a rack axis, switching to a back-up steering motor, and complementing a failure with a rear-wheel steering system have been applied to a steer-by-wire fault tolerant system (Cesiel et al. (2006) , Verschuren et al. (2006) ). On the other hand, reallocating the driving force lost by a failure to other normal wheels, for a vehicle where all four wheels have independent torque control, has been applied to a drive-bywire fault tolerant system (Yamaguchi et al. (2006 ), Wang et al. (2009 ). These previous works handle only either a steering or a drive-train system failure. Furthermore, these methods do not take into consideration a cooperation with other systems and attempt to secure safety by sensors, microprocessors, and actuators of one's own. As a result, an additional redundancy for both a steering and a drivetrain system is required. Therefore these methods may also have a negative impact on a cost and a vehicle's weight.
Taking into account these issues, we propose a fault tolerant control system for steer-by-wire which requires neither a fault detection nor an additional redundancy for the fault tolerant purpose (Ito et al. (2012) ). However our proposed fault tolerant control system is also based on the assumption that the drive-train system does not have any trouble.
In this paper, we propose a more practical fault tolerant control system for mitigating steering and drivetrain system failures, which does not require an additional component redundancy for the fault tolerant purpose. In the proposed fault tolerant control system, the steering system failure, which requires a quick corrective action, is immediately compensated for by the drive-train system without a fault detection. On the other hand, the drivetrain system failure, which does not require a quick corrective action, is compensated for by the fault detection and the steering system. Finally, we confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed method in the simulation.
MODELING
The electric vehicle discussed in this paper is equipped with steer-by-wire and in-wheel motors. The planar dy- 
The rolling resistances 2D f , D rr , and D rl appear in (1) as a total resistance
The cornering forces Y f , Y rr , and Y rl have non-linear characteristics given by the following equations:
where k f and k r are a front and rear friction coefficient of a road surface, α f and α r are a front and rear slip angle given by 
The models of cornering forces (5)- (8) are too complicated to use when a fault tolerant controller is considered. Thus, in order to design the controller, the following equations are used
which are derived by linearly approximating (5)- (8) around the origin of (β, γ, δ). Notice that the linear models (9) and (10) are used for control design, while the nonlinear models (5)- (8) are used for numerical simulations in this paper.
In addition, we consider a steering system (see Fig.2 ) given by
where the steering motor torque T includes the commanded motor current, the motor constant relating current to torque, and the gearbox ratio. The second term 2ξY f is the aligning moment resulting from lateral tire forces.
It is easy to imagine that a driver would try to generate not only the yaw rate but also the lateral acceleration in the case of an emergency avoidance maneuver. Thus, a linear combination of the yaw rate γ and the lateral acceleration V (β + γ), i.e.,
is adopted as the control output (Moriyama (2004) ).
Summing up the modeling shown above, the vehicle model for controller design is given by (2), (3), and (9)- (12) 
Notice that the vehicle model for numerical simulation is given by (1)- (8), (11), and (12), which is a nonlinear system with the vehicle speed V being varying.
DESIGN OF FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL SYSTEM
In this paper, we assume a situation in which either the steering system or the drive-train system fails, where a steering system failure means that the steering motor torque is forced to zero (T = 0) and a drive-train system failure means that one of two in-wheel motors driving torque is forced to zero (F rr = 0 or F rl = 0). Notice that the simultaneous failure of the steering system and the drive-train system is not considered.
These failures occur when the driver integrated-circuit (IC) cuts the current due to over-current and over-heating of the motor. The reason why we consider these situation is that the protective function of the driver IC will work first and prevent a permanent failure such as a steering-lock, a self-steering, and a vehicle overrun.
The purpose of the fault tolerant control system proposed in this paper is to prevent unintended vehicle behavior after the failure occurrence and to allow an avoidance maneuver. A block diagram presented in Fig.3 shows a basic structure of the proposed fault tolerant control system. The D * control block has a role of the fault tolerant for the steering system failure. The force distribution and the fault detection blocks have a role of the fault tolerant for the drive-train system failure. We will explain these functions in detail in the following subsections. The driving force demand block has a role of calculating the driving force command by an accelerator pedal angle. X + , X − , and T c are command signals of the driving force, the left and right driving force difference and the steering motor, respectively.
D * Control
We consider a steer-by-wire control system as shown in 
is calculated from a steering wheel angle or a steering wheel torque. C 1 (s) is a steering motor controller, which is derived by applying optimal regulator and Kalman filter design techniques to G 1 (s) with an integrator. Notice that a part which distributes X − , T c to F rr , F rl , and T is omitted in Fig.4 .
It is easy to see from Fig.4 that
The main part of D * control block is shown as a dotted box (Fig.5) with a low pass filter L p (s), which corresponds to the disturbance observer.
In fact, in the normal situation, the signal "e" in Fig.5 is zero, i.e., Fig.5 is consistent with Fig.4 . On the other hand, when the steering system fails (T c = 0 in Fig.4) , the signal y 1 is not controlled and thus the signal "e" becomes nonzero, i.e., the disturbance observer starts working. In this situation, the transfer function 
which means that in the low-frequency range (i.e.,
. Therefore it can be concluded that the steering system failure can be removed almost perfectly by the proposed D * control block even with the modeling errors.
Force Distribution
The force distribution design is based on the idea of compensating for the drive-train failure effect by utilizing steer-by-wire and one normal in-wheel motor. On the basis of the fault detection signal from the fault detection block, the force distribution block distributes the commands X + , X − , and T c to the vehicle inputs F rr , F rl , and T not to change the relationship between X + , X − , T c and D * , V . Figure 6 indicates a detail structure of the force distribution block. SW i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) denotes a switch controlled by the fault detection block.
In the normal configuration (i.e., the drive-train system is normal), all the switches are connected to the terminal "N" as shown in Fig.6 . Then it is easy to see that the distribution law is given by 
where T c (s) is controlled by the controller C 1 (s) and X − (s) is controlled by the disturbance observer.
When the failure F rr = 0 occurs, SW3 is switched to the terminal "RL" and the other switches are changed to the terminal "R" in Fig.6 . Then the distribution law is
proper. Note that for the safety, F rr (s) is forced to be zero by SW1. It is easy to see from (1) that (22) allows the vehicle speed V to be invariant. On the other hand, from (13), (22), and (23)
Therefore it is concluded that even if F rr = 0 happens, in the low-frequency range (i.e.,L p (s) → 1) D * (s) given by (24) is almost same as one given by (21), the normal D * (s).
When the failure F rl = 0 occurs, SW3 is switched to the terminal "RL" and the other swiches are changed to the terminal "L" in Fig.6 . Then the distribution law is
26) and the similar argument as in the case of F rr = 0 proves that the control object is successfully achieved.
If the modeling errors are taken into consideration, G −1 1 (s) and G 2 (s) in Fig.6 are changed to those modelsĜ −1 1 (s) and G 2 (s), respectively. Then (24) turns out to be
where 
The target value which realizes a circling 100 [m] Fig.13 . Notice that the difference between F rr and F rl before t = 20[s] is also caused for the model parameter uncertainty. In addition, the drive-train failure is supposed to be detected at t = 21[s]. As described in Fig.13 , the F rl input increases to compensate for the lack of a driving ability after the fault detection. Furthermore, the steering motor torque also increases to cancel out the effect of yaw moment caused by the biased driving force F rl . Figure 15 shows a vehicle speed. At the moment after the drive-train system failure occurs, the vehicle speed decreases in consequence of rolling resistances. After the fault detection and the driving force reconfiguration, the vehicle can maintain the speed. Thanks to the proposed fault tolerant control, the output D 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes the fault tolerant control method for the steering or the drive-train system failure. The main feature of this method is that it does not require redundant actuators by taking advantage of existing vehicle functions. We will take into account a possible sensor failure in our future work. 
